Until a more detailed response is provided by our resident amateur histor=
ians
[(Kamal, Paulos N, Kennedy and Ghidewon (4 months & 2 days)], I would lik=
e to
quote parts of a great book that answers some of the questions you raised=
...
The book is "Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution". I will quote, without
comment, relevant parts that I think contribute to the thread of loyalty,
patriotism, shifting alliances (which, I think, supports your position,
Habte). One correction, Habte, contrary to common folktale, the Turks wer=
e
not involved in the excesses of Ahmed Gragn; his zealotry was
self-motivated... =20
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
ISAAK, THE TURKS and MALAK SAGAD
<<=85[After 1557]...For nearly 20 years the Turks continued some form of
occupation of the highlands. The Eritrean ruler (Bahr Negash, or Lord of=
the
Seas) Issak remained in open revolt against the Turkish pasha.
Eventually both Isaak and the pasha were killed in battle by the Ethiopi=
an
king, Malak Sagad. Ten years later, in 1589, an Eritrean chief, Walda Ez=
um
struck an alliance with the new pasha, against the Ethiopian emperor's tr=
oops
in Eritrea. The Turks were again defeated in the highlands and retreated=
to
their heavily defended base at Harkiko, there resisting further Ethiopian
advances. All efforts to drive the Turks into the sea were to no avail.
The Ethiopian king (or negus) consented to peace with the Turks. The Tu=
rks
thus remained for three more centuries on the Eritrean coast, which would
never again obey an Ethiopian ruler. During their 300-year occupation of
Massawa and the Red Sea coast, the Turks continued to enter into various
alliances with the (respective) Bahr Negash.>>
THE SWISS, THE EGYPTIANS, THE SUDANESE, THE BRITS & YOHANNES=20
....
<<The Egyptian decision to advance to the plateau was largely influenced=
by
Werner Munzinger, a Swiss national who joined the Egyptian service as
governor of Massawa. Munzinger, as military strategist, vastly
underestimated the forces of Yohannes, who was certainly prepared to keep=
the
Egyptians from advancing further to the Christian plateau. In November 1=
875,
Yohannes completely destroyed the Egyptian forces at Gundet. In March 18=
76,
a more massive Egyptian force was again decimated at the battle of Gura. =
The
threat of Egypt to the highlands had ended.
Yohannes sent his army north in 1879, defeated the Eritrean chiefs, and
established his viceroy in tow huts in the small village of Asmara.
Ethiopian forces, however, controlled the Eritrean highlands for a very
short time, from 1880 to 1889.
During this period, Yohannes became preoccupied with repulsing the Mahdi=
sts
threatening Ethiopia from the Sudan. Yohannes had designs on driving the
Egyptians from Massawa and the coast. He was led to believe, by the Brit=
ish,
that Massawa and Keren would both be his if he helped quell the Mahdist
forces. To this effect, he signed a treaty with Britain and Egypt agains=
t
the Mahdists in 1884. Although Yohannes carried out his end of the barga=
in,
the British reneged on theirs. Instead of helping Yohannes to occupy
Massawa, the British actively encouraged the Italians, in 1885, to seize =
the
port city from the Egyptians.>>
MENELIK & THE ITALIANS
<< Menlik's treaties and frontier demarcations with the Italians between =
1889
and 1896, effectively establishing the political bourndaries of Eritrea,
"were not the work of hasty or dictated trieaties; they were free and for=
mal
acts of the Ethiopian state." These demarcations were to be the basis of
future Eritrean nationalist sentiments, which are discussed below.
<<Menelik, for various political and economic reasons, affirmed Italian
hegemony in Eritrea on three separate occasions: in the Uccialli Treaty o=
n
May 2, 1889; after the Battle of Adowa of March 1, 1896; and in the Addis
Ababa Peace Treaty of October 26, 1896. In doing so, the Eritreans belie=
ve,
Ethiopia forfeited any claim that it might have ever had to Eritrea. The
effect of Menelik's actions in allowing the Italians to colonize Eritrea =
was
the de facto recognition of the Medri Bahri as a political entity separat=
e
from Ethiopia.">>
And it goes on and on telling the history of the people known as "Agazian=
",
"Sabeans" or "Habesha." My favorite part of the book goes a little furth=
er
back in history; it deals with the Axum kingdom...
<<It has been observed that "the Axum kingdom corresponded very little wi=
th
the modern state of Ethiopia. It did not in its golden age, extend
southwards beyond the limits of the present Tigre (province)." Observati=
ons
such as the above had led some to the thesis that Axumite civilization wa=
s
"more of an Eritrean history than an Ethiopian one.">>
Which is why, if I were the Eritrean minister in charge of approving buil=
ding
contracts, I would freeze all bids to construct buildings in Eritrea, tel=
l
the Koreans to spend a few months unlearning everything they know about h=
ow
to construct hideous high rises, go to Axum, copy the architectural motif=
of
the ancient towers and duplicate them en masse in Eritrea. That is OURS,
thank you very much. This way, tourists who visit Eritrea wouldn't, after
visiting Mariam DeArit and Gurgusum, say, "now what?" Imagine "Axum"
postcards on Eritrea's tourism commission with a tag line: "3000 Years Of
History, 3000 Km of Red Sea." Ah, the irony.
Saleh
Fremont, CA USA