British Broadcasting Corporation
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
February 27, 1997, Thursday
HEADLINE: President Isayas on foreign aid, relations with Yemen, Sudan
SOURCE:'Al-Sharq al-Awsat', London, in Arabic 23 Feb 97
BODY: Eritrean President Isayas Afewerki has said the Khartoum govern-
ment is "about to collapse". In an interview with 'Al-Sharq al-Awsat',
President Isayas said that the problems between Eritrea and the Sudane-
se National Islamic Front started even before the liberation of
Eritrea. He said that the problem of the Hanish islands with Yemen
could have been solved by the two countries and "there was no
justification for Arab states to intervene".
The following are excerpts from an interview with the Eritrean
president by Zayn al-Abidin Ahmad in Asmara; date not given, published
by London-based newspaper 'Al-Sharq al-Awsat' on 23rd February;
subheadings inserted editorially:
...[Ahmad] Eritrea is accused of continuing to use its revolutionary
rhetoric in politics, when it is going through a new phase as an
independent state.
Economic policy and foreign aid
[Isayas] The problem lies in the fact that there are observers or
monitors offering superficial interpretations of what is happening here
in Eritrea. Actually the transitional period required us to conduct a
full assessment of our struggle experiment and studies of what is
required from the government, and to assess political, social and
economic action. Our economic policy is based on openness and free
economic activities in order to overcome the difficulties facing us as
a result of the long war.
All these factors played a role in defining Eritrea's political
orientation. And through this orientation we tried to learn from the
experiments of others, especially the Third World states in Africa. Not
all of these experiments are rich; they have their negative aspects. We
have our own policies and an approach different from that of the states
and societies in question. And this is part of our policy in dealing
with industrialized and developed states and the so-called donor
states. Our opinion differs from the familiar approach pursued with
these states, which we believe is unbalanced, since these states are
the donor states and decide everything. They make the decisions and
even implement the programmes and projects. We rejected this approach,
because it failed all African experiments and the policies based on
such convictions are unsound. I believe that this approach might not
appeal to others, and it seems that those considering themselves
experts in such matters think that our present policies are similar to
those which we pursued in the liberation stage. I believe that this is
superficial thinking which does not understand what is happening inside
Eritrea.
[Q] Eritrea is relying on its own resources within the framework of
the self-reliance policy. Why has Eritrea not received the anticipated
aid as a new state?
[A] First of all, the resources in Eritrea are more than sufficient if
we look at matters closely, especially as the population does not
exceed three million. Had it not been for the war - which destroyed the
institutions, infrastructure and capabilities - we would have benefited
much more from the resources in Eritrea. However, surmounting these
difficulties requires Eritrea to rely in one way or another on foreign
aid, but wisely, because this aid is temporary. Thus we should work to
avoid such an option and to consolidate our own capabilities. And this
has been our policy. I believe that the experiment of the last five
years has proved successful in this connection...
Arab investment
[Q] You have strong and historic relations with Arab states. Why have
these states not made a move to support Eritrea at this stage? Is this
attributable to a laxity in Eritrea's move towards these states?
[A] Our relations with the Arab states are distinct, and there is
cooperation, especially in the transitional phase. The opportunities
offered to us by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and
other states confirm this cooperation, which is based on clear
foundations. This is in addition to the programmes based on our
relations with other states outside the region. The matter is also
dependent on the self-reliance policy and approach. Nevertheless, the
options should be to develop good relations with the Arab states and to
encourage Arab investment in Eritrea. Actually the main problem is that
the favourable conditions for expanding investments still have not
reached the required level, especially with regard to the infrastructu-
re: roads, bridges, airports, communications, energy,electricity and
other services. These services are not available sufficiently, and we
are working to provide all these services in order to encourage Arab
investment. Our official cooperation with Arab governments reflects the
good relations.
Hanish islands, relations with Yemen
[Q] The Greater Hanish [island] issue has been referred to interna-
tional arbitration. Are you optimistic that a solution acceptable to
Eritrea will be secured?
[A] I am optimistic, first because matters have now reached their
natural place, that is, arbitration. My optimism is based on the fact
that Eritrea is in the right. I am also optimistic because the
arbitration will be fair and will settle the dispute. What Yemen did in
1995 was unjustifiable, and the arbitration will confirm this. In the
end the arbitration panel's decision on the issue will be in favour of
both countries, Eritrea and Yemen, thus eliminating tension and
securing that strategic part of the Red Sea.
[Q] Why is it that, despite your agreement to turn to international
arbitration, relations between Eritrea and Yemen still have not
returned to normal?
[A] It is not to do with the islands issue. Even the islands issue and
the confrontation that occurred in 1995 could have been contained, but
the complications and escalation came from a political force which was
eager to exploit the situation and harm relations between the Yemeni
and Eritrean peoples. This force played a major role in the media and
political escalation in order to exaggerate the problem and create
splits between the two peoples. So these groups became obstacles in the
way of normalizing and cementing bilateral relations. This is why
normalization of relations has not been quick. In fact the tension in
our relations has nothing to do with what happened in the islands. As I
said, the problem is to do with the forces allied with the ruling re-
gime in Yemen. These forces have their influence and their strategies
inside and outside Yemen. Had it not been for them, there would have
been no problem in the first place.
[Q] The problem has also adversely affected relations with some Arab
states which supported Yemen. Are there serious steps to clarify your
position and to reactivate these relations?
[A] The problem in the Arab world requires great efforts to overcome.
There are political forces seeking to turn public opinion against us
with regard to any issue. They must talk about Israel to ensure there
are emotional reactions, hence decisions are made hastily without
referring to the facts of any dispute. The forces in question tried to
portray what happened during the crisis between us and Yemen as an
Israeli problem, when Israel had nothing to do with it.
Simply, unobjective reactions and a kind of lack of clarity tend to be
the response to political issues in the Arab world, especially when
Israel's name is mentioned. This is the problem. Actually the problem
between us and Yemen could have been settled by us, and there was no
justification for Arab states to intervene in such a manner...
Relations with Sudan and Egypt
[Q] You must have been satisfied with Egyptian President Husni
Mubarak's statements in which he said that what is happening on Sudan's
eastern border is a Sudanese affair and not foreign intervention. Have
these statements brought you closer to one another?
[A] Certainly the statement came at the right time. The strange thing
is that the Khartoum regime, which tried to assassinate President
Mubarak, is now asking Mubarak to rescue it from the crisis into which
it has driven itself. I believe that the stand adopted by President
Mubarak, who is aware of the situation and events in Sudan, has
revealed to the Arab world and the world as a whole that the [Sudanese]
regime is openly trying [to say that the crisis] is not an internal
issue. It is trying to conceal its own domestic problems and hide
behind delusions to deceive Sudanese and Arabs.
The publication of these statements following the Sudanese vice-presi-
dent's visit to Egypt reflected the facts they had tried to conceal.
With regard to our relations with Egypt, some unfortunate stands were
adopted during the dispute with Yemen. These stands were biased and
unjustifiable. They were adopted by some newspapers to try to mislead
public opinion. That created a kind of crisis in Egyptian-Eritrean
relations in general. However, cooperation between us in confronting
all terrorist actions in the region is continuing and has not been
affected by such problems. We still believe that bilateral relations
with Egypt must be viewed from a strategic angle.
[Q] Sudan has continued to accuse Eritrea of attacking Sudan, parading
Eritreans on Sudanese television as POWs from the Eritrean forces that
attacked the Sudanese border.
[A] That is strange, because there is no evidence. Actually Eritreans
in Sudan have become refugees and hostages held by the regime. The
problem is not to do with the Eritreans arrested there, since all our
people, like the Sudanese people, are held in the regime's [metapho-
rical] jail. The question of parading some Eritreans as POWs from the
Eritrean army is a desperate attempt by the Khartoum regime to justify
its lies. It is clear bankruptcy in the regime's understanding of the
reality known to the world as a whole. We are not part of the problem,
and if the regime has clear evidence, it has to introduce it, instead
of exploiting innocent people and subjecting them to such practices.
This idea has been exposed as a clear trick.
Eritrean opposition in Sudan
[Q] What is your information about the Eritrean opposition groups
sheltered by Sudan, and what is their real size?
[A] When the pressure intensified on the Khartoum regime as a result of
the fighting, the regime's shaykh, [National Islamic Front leader
Hasan] al-Turabi, stated that he would mobilize one million Eritreans
and Ethiopians to launch a counterattack against Eritrea and Ethiopia.
First of all, where is the million about whom he is talking? They have
for seven years been trying to create an Eritrean force to be under
their command and to use at any time. And they recently pushed the
Eritreans - by force - into People's Defence Force and special training
camps. Despite all this, they failed. If their attempts had succeeded,
it would have become apparent that there is effective Eritrean opposi-
tion in Sudan. The Eritreans contributed to and participated in
achieving independence, and thus they would not sabotage their country,
for which they made great sacrifices, for Turabi's sake. I do not rule
out that there could be some individuals who failed to achieve anything
during the liberation period and thus agreed to become a tool in the
regime's hands.
Numerous Eritreans are held there, but they are rejecting Turabi's
ambitions,and that has thwarted all the Khartoum regime's aims of
exploiting human resources against the Eritrean people.
Sudanese opposition; possibility of dialogue with Sudan
[Q] Do you believe, as the Sudanese opposition says, that the countdown
to the Khartoum regime's downfall has begun?
[A] Anyone following what is happening in Sudan can see that the
Khartoum regime is about to collapse, and indeed the countdown began
more than two years ago. In the past, the problem was limited to
southern Sudan, especially on the Kenyan and Ugandan borders with
Sudan. Three years ago, the regime stressed that the [Sudan] People's
[Liberation] Movement [SPLM] would disappear in a matter of days, but
the situation changed later in the SPLM's favour. The regime did not
admit that then. Instead, it started to accuse Uganda, Kenya, and South
Africa of supporting the SPLM. Events in eastern Sudan came to confirm
the countdown of the regime's collapse. They also exposed the regime's
weakness. This is in addition to changes inside the [National Democra-
tic] Alliance [NDA], Sadiq al-Mahdi's flight, and the regional and
international stand towards Sudan. All these are indications of that
regime's collapse. It is a matter of time.
[Q] Khartoum has in one way or another announced its willingness to
hold a dialogue with you. The most recent initiative was a statement by
a Sudanese official about the acceptance of dialogue and mediation with
Eritrea or Ethiopia, but not with the opposition.
[A] In this connection we have had fixed and clear convictions in
Eritrea since 1989. When Turabi came to power under the cover of a
military coup, the Islamic Front started to create an Eritrean
opposition before Eritrea was liberated. We knew what their aim was and
tried to persuade the Islamic Front to backtrack on its objective and
to contain the crisis and build cordial relations with the other
parties. We continued to try [to persuade it to do that] until 1991.
Eritrea was liberated and we continued the dialogue and refused to
allow any broker to intervene between us, but the regime violated all
agreements and broke the numerous promises we had received. And the
Khartoum regime continued to sabotage relations and harm our
orientations until 1993.
Then the border incident occurred, and the subversive elements were
non-Sudanese. We tried to contain the crisis but we failed, so we had
to send a complaint to the Security Council and the United Nations
merely to inform them of the incident, then we severed relations. The
Islamic Front continues to harbour a lot of hostility towards us. This
is why we are working to establish relations with the Sudanese people
and those representing the Sudanese people, namely the NDA, which is
the correct alternative. Our decision to side with the NDA is not
tactical or a bargaining chip. It is a fixed principle, thus there is
no room for any dialogue or reconciliation with the Turabi regime. If
the regime wants reconciliation, it has to be reconciled with itself
and the Sudanese people before seeking reconciliation with any other
party: Eritrea or any other party. Our fixed principles prompt us not
to deal with a regime rejected by the Sudanese people.
[Q] We have learned that meetings took place between you and Muhammad
Abu al-Qasim Hajj Hammad to consult over an initiative he is making. Is
Eritrea playing any role in this mediation, and what did you discuss?
[A] I met Sudanese brothers like Muhammad Abu al-Qasim Hajj Hamad in
1966 when he was in charge of one of the Eritrean liberation offices.
He was a struggler with us, and this relationship continued for 30
years. He was a friend of ours and of many of the [Eritrean] People's
[Liberation] Front cadres. He worked earnestly to find a way out of the
crisis for the Sudanese people. We always discuss this matter and agree
on one thing, namely that we should find a way out for the Sudanese
people. He recently came with specific ideas which I considered
personal views aimed at changing the Khartoum regime's orientations.
We discussed these ideas, and we told him that that regime is not
credible, and that deception and lying are part of its strategy,
especially in view of the hysteria and alarm experienced by Islamic
Front cadres who are trying to a find a way out. We told him that our
experience tells us that that regime has no willingness to change its
behaviour.
We emphasized to him that the problem is not Eritrean-Sudanese but,
rather, a Sudanese problem. We told him that, if you are convinced of
the idea of exerting efforts in this connection, it is your own opinion
and we have nothing to do with the matter, and that Eritrea's stand
towards Khartoum is fixed and specific.
What was presented is a personal initiative from him, and it concerns
domestic questions. No mediation was proposed, and Abu al-Qasim is one
of the people who can contribute to Sudanese-Eritrean relations in the
future. Abu al-Qasim's move pushed Eritrea's name into the matter
because of the cordial relations between us and him. But Eritrea has
nothing to do with the issue at all...
LOAD-DATE: February 26, 1997
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